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Abstract
In general, invariants may depend on the state of other objects. The approach introduced in this paper
allows this for objects of mutually visible classes, in a way that supports modular veriﬁcation. To this
end, dependencies are made explicit by cooperation. In particular, invariants expressing non-hierarchical
object relations are supported. Furthermore, an inc-set allows a method to specify explicitly that it does
not depend on the validity of a certain invariant. This way, it can be called even when that invariant is
violated.
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1 Introduction
We present an approach that allows the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of powerful
invariants and supports the modular style of Object-Oriented (OO) development.
Such modular development is essential for the component-based paradigm.
A class invariant describes the consistent states of objects instantiated from
that class. In general, such an invariant can relate the state of several objects. For
instance, in the well-known Observer Pattern [4], an observer is consistent when
its state matches that of its subject. Traditionally, one expects invariants to hold
in the pre- and post-states of method executions. Two problems related to such
invariants are dealt with by our approach.
The ﬁrst problem is that invariants that relate arbitrary objects can not be
modularly veriﬁed. This means we have to restrict these relations. We introduce
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the concept of cooperation to explicitly express relations in a way that minimizes
veriﬁcation eﬀort.
The second problem is that method calls from inconsistent states are sometimes
unavoidable. In case of the Observer Pattern, when the subject’s state has been
updated, it calls the inconsistent observers to notify them of the update. In our
approach, invariants hold in all pre- and post-states of method executions unless
explicitly speciﬁed otherwise. To this end, our approach introduces the novel speci-
ﬁcation construct inc (for inconsistent). This construct allows a method to specify
explicitly that it does not depend on the validity of a certain invariant.
We discuss the concepts introduced above in more detail in section 1.1, and give
an overview of the rest of the paper in section 1.2.
1.1 Concepts
In this paper we consider Java-like OO languages. Speciﬁcations of OO programs
are often based on two fundamental speciﬁcation constructs, namely on pre- and
post-conditions for methods and on class invariants. Class invariants can simplify
proofs and speciﬁcations as the invariant predicates can be assumed to hold in
speciﬁc program states. Furthermore, by capturing a desired state relation, an
invariant can guide the design of methods that have access to that state.
The power of invariants is determined by their expressiveness, i.e. by the rela-
tions they can describe in a program state, and by their semantic strength, which
determines in which program states such a relation holds. However, for invariants
to be a useful ingredient of speciﬁcations, their power has to be balanced against
their manageability. Manageability is determined by the required speciﬁcation eﬀort
(the ease of speciﬁcation of desired relations) and veriﬁcation eﬀort (the number
and complexity of the proof obligations associated with invariants).
Finally, veriﬁcation should support the modular style of OO development [13].
OO programs have an explicit structure in which classes are grouped into modules
(think of components or Java packages). Modular veriﬁcation means a class C is
veriﬁed using only speciﬁcations of classes visible to C, where class D is visible to
class C when C and D are in the same module or when C’s module imports D’s
module. Furthermore, such veriﬁcation requires proof that C is well-behaved. That
is, there are proof obligations not induced by the speciﬁcation of C itself. This is
needed to guarantee that a class meets its speciﬁcation in any well-behaved context,
as the behavior of a class can be aﬀected by classes not visible to it. For instance,
consider overriding of methods, which requires a form of behavioral subtyping [11,5].
1.2 Overview
The next section introduces some basic terminology used in the paper. Our ap-
proach is presented in sections 3, 4 and 5. Section 3 discusses cooperation, section
4 deals with method calls from inconsistent states and section 5 presents proof obli-
gations for the modular veriﬁcation of invariants. We discuss existing approaches
in section 6 and future work in section 7. The last section presents our conclusions.
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2 Terminology
This section introduces terminology used in relation with invariants.
C and D identify classes (that is, C and D are typical elements of the set of
class names). f identiﬁes a ﬁeld (also known as instance variable). To simplify
the presentation, a subclass is not allowed to deﬁne a ﬁeldname that has already
been deﬁned in a superclass (known as ﬁeld shadowing). Extending our approach
to allow ﬁeld shadowing is straightforward.
α identiﬁes an object, i.e. the instantiation of a class (think of α as an address).
A location α.fC stores the value of object α’s ﬁeld f deﬁned in class C. Class
C is often omitted as it can be inferred from the type of α. g denotes a ﬁeld
access of the form .f . For i ≥ 1, deﬁne α1 g1 . . . gi inductively in the following way:
α1 g1 . . . gi = α2 gi when α1 g1 . . . gi−1 = α2. For instance, when α1.f1 = α2 and
α2.f2 = α3, α1.f1.f2 = α3.
In Java-like languages, objects and their contents are accessed by reference ex-
pressions. For simplicity, we only consider references that consist of a scope variable
and zero or more ﬁeld accesses. A scope variable s is either the keyword variable
this, a method parameter p, a local variable v or a logical variable X. A reference
r is an expression of the form s g1 . . . gi, i ≥ 0. A this-reference t is a reference in
which the scope variable is this. Scope variable this is often omitted in Java-like
programs. When r = s g1 . . . gi and 1 ≤ j ≤ i, reference s g1 . . . gj is called a subref-
erence of r (note that r is a subreference of r but, for technical reasons, s is not).
While method selection is dynamic in Java-like languages, ﬁeld selection is static.
statType(r) yields the static type of reference r. All references in this paper are
assumed to be type-correct (and thus to have a static type). r#t, the concatena-
tion of reference r and this-reference t, is deﬁned by r#(this g1 . . . gi) =
def r g1 . . . gi.
For instance, this.f1.f2#this.f3.f4 = this.f1.f2.f3.f4. When α1 g1 . . . gi = α2, we say
this-reference this g1 . . . gi refers from α1 to α2.
We call the subset of predicates that are allowed as an invariant invariant pred-
icates. We use R as typical element of such predicates. In this paper, we do not
consider invariants that quantify over objects (see section 7). Eﬀectively, this means
every reference in an invariant is a this-reference. When this-reference t occurs in in-
variant predicate R, we call every subreference of t a supplier reference of R. sup(R)
yields the set of supplier references of invariant predicate R. When t.f ∈ sup(R)
and statType(t) = C, we say that R depends on ﬁeld f of class C.
A program state is called a visible state if it is a pre- or post-state of a method
execution [14]. The traditional semantics of invariants, in which all invariants hold
in all visible states, is referred to as the visible state semantics.
The OO syntax in the examples is assumed self-explanatory. In the examples
we ignore the orthogonal issue of how to specify what a method leaves untouched
[9,18]. This problem is alleviated, but not solved by invariants. Furthermore, all
ﬁelds are considered publicly available at the speciﬁcation level. Hiding ﬁelds at
this level [16,13] is a separate concern. See for instance [8,9,13] for speciﬁcation
language support for information hiding.
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class Node {
Node next coop I(this), J(next);
Node prev coop J(this), I(prev);
inv I def this.next = null ∨ this = this.next.prev;
inv J def this.prev = null ∨ this = this.prev.next;
Node() {this.prev := null; this.next := null;}
void insertAfter(Node n) {
pre: this.next = null ∧ this.prev = null ∧ n = null ∧ n.next = X
post: n.next = this ∧ this.next = X
this.prev := n; this.next := n.next; n.next := this;
if (this.next = null) { this.next.prev := this; }
}
}
Example 1. Doubly Linked Nodes
3 Cooperation
This section introduces the concept of cooperation. Cooperation entails that a ﬁeld
speciﬁes explicitly, through the speciﬁcation construct coop, which invariants might
be invalidated when the ﬁeld is assigned to. Cooperation restricts dependencies to
those that are mutually visible (that is, when an invariant in class C depends on
a ﬁeld of a class D, D is visible to C and vice versa). This restriction enables
modular veriﬁcation of invariants given the visible state semantics. Furthermore,
this explicit speciﬁcation greatly reduces the total veriﬁcation eﬀort required.
Of course, the most expressive invariants are those that can depend on arbitrary
ﬁelds. However, in that case any assignment can possibly invalidate such an invari-
ant. That means that, given the visible state semantics, any pair of an invariant
and a method has to be veriﬁed. In [7], whole-program analysis is used to verify
these pairs. Unfortunately, such an approach does not support modular veriﬁcation
(section 1.1). When modularly verifying a class that deﬁnes an invariant, it can not
be proven that methods of other classes preserve the invariant as their implementa-
tion is not available. Furthermore, when modularly verifying whether a method is
well-behaved, it can not be proven that it preserves all invariants of all classes, as
not all classes are visible. Therefore, a restriction of dependencies is unavoidable.
In our approach, a class can deﬁne multiple, named invariants. An invariant is
deﬁned in a class in the following way:
inv I def R
That is, an invariant has a name I and a deﬁnition R (which is an invariant
predicate). IC identiﬁes the invariant with name I deﬁned in class C. def(IC)
yields the invariant predicate R that is the deﬁnition of invariant IC . To simplify
the presentation, we do not allow a subclass to deﬁne an invariant name that has
already been deﬁned in a superclass (which we call invariant shadowing). Extending
our approach to allow invariant shadowing is straightforward.
An invariant deﬁned in a class must hold for every instantiation of that class.
To diﬀerentiate between these instantiations, we introduce instantiated invariants.
Instantiated invariant IC(α) identiﬁes the instantiation of invariant IC on object α.
To identify instantiated invariants in the speciﬁcation language, reference invariants
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are used. A reference invariant IC(r) identiﬁes instantiated invariant IC(α) when
reference r refers to object α. We call r the dependent reference of IC(r). Classname
C is often omitted in instantiated or reference invariants as it can be inferred from
α’s type or r’s static type.
When, in a given state, a change of the value of location α.f can invalidate
instantiated invariant I(α), we call I(α) vulnerable to α.f in that state. For instance,
in example 1, when α is a Node object, J(α) is vulnerable to α.prev in a state in
which α.prev stores null and α.prev.next doesn’t store α.
With every location, our approach associates a set of instantiated invariants that
may be vulnerable to that location. While this requires some additional speciﬁcation
eﬀort, it greatly reduces overall veriﬁcation eﬀort. In a well-behaved method, the
instantiated invariants associated with locations the method assigns to are reproven,
but nothing has to be proven for invariants not in this set (see section 5). Note that
this beneﬁts from having multiple, named invariants. Furthermore, this means that
the more accurate the set is, the less veriﬁcation eﬀort is required. Properties of
locations are speciﬁed by properties of ﬁelds. In our approach, a ﬁeld is speciﬁed in
the following way:
modiﬁer T f coop coop-set
The access modiﬁer modiﬁer, type T and name f of the ﬁeld are all standard.
The coop-set is a set of reference invariants. We say the ﬁeld cooperates with these
reference invariants. For instance, in example 1, ﬁeld next of class Node cooperates
with I(this) and J(next). When class D deﬁnes a ﬁeld f and C is a subclass of D,
coop(f,C) yields the coop-set of ﬁeld f of class D.
Now consider a location α1.fC . When this-reference t refers from α1 to α2 in
a given state, and I(t) ∈ coop(f,C), we say α1.fC cooperates with I(α2) in that
state.
The cooperation obligation below ensures that an instantiated invariant is only
vulnerable to locations that cooperate with it. Only invariants that meet this obli-
gation are admissible. An invariant meets this obligation when it can be written as
a disjunction of invariant predicates R1∨. . .∨Ri
2 , where dco(Rj , IC) holds for every
disjunct Rj . dco(Rj , IC) holds when, for every supplier reference t1.f of Rj , there is
a this-reference t2 such that ﬁeld f on which the invariant depends cooperates with
I(t2), and such that Rj ⇒ this = t1#t2. This implication guarantees cooperation
with the appropriate instantiated invariant when invariant predicate Rj holds.
cooperation : there exists a set of invariant predicates R1 to Ri such that:
(def(IC)⇔ R1 ∨ . . . ∨Ri) and (∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ i : dco(Rj, IC))
dco(R, IC) =
def ∀t1, f : t1.f ∈ sup(R) : (∃t2 :: I(t2) ∈ coop(f, statType(t1)) and
R ⇒ this = t1#t2)
Node’s invariant J, for instance, meets the cooperation obligation. When R1 is
this.prev = null and R2 is this = this.prev.next, def(JNode) ⇔ R1 ∨ R2. R1 has
a single supplier reference, this.prev, which cooperates as the ﬁeld prev has J(this)
2 ∨, ⇒ and ⇔ are symbols from the underlying predicate logic, ∃ and ∀ are not
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in its coop-set and as this = this#this is trivially true. R2 has supplier references
this.prev and this.prev.next. The cooperation argument for this.prev is the same as
above. Consider this.prev.next. The static type of this.prev is Node. Field next of
class Node cooperates with J(this.next), as J(this.next) ∈ coop(next, Node). Since
this = this.prev.next ⇒ this = this.prev#this.next, the cooperation obligation is
met.
Treating individual disjuncts in the cooperation obligation allows the coop-set to
be more accurate than when the entire invariant is treated at once. Also, it allows
for a weaker obligation, which means that more invariants are admissible. The static
set of supplier references of an invariant deﬁnes a dynamic set of suppliers to an
instantiated invariant: location α1.f is a supplier to instantiated invariant IC(α2) in
a given state when IC has a supplier reference t.f and t refers from α1 to α2 in that
state. In any state, the set of locations to which IC(α) is vulnerable is a subset of
its set of suppliers. The obligation ensures that suppliers to a valid disjunct of the
invariant cooperate. The invariant is not vulnerable to a supplier that only occurs
in invalid disjuncts, as assignment to such a supplier might re-validate the disjunct,
but can not invalidate it. Why the obligation ensures cooperation with the right
object is illustrated by the picture and text below.
By deﬁnition, when t1.f ∈ sup(def(IC)) and t1 refers from α1 to α2, α2.f is
a supplier to IC(α1). α2.f cooperates with IC(α1) when there is a this-reference
t2 such that IC(t2) ∈ coop(f, statType(t1)) and such that t2 refers from α2 to α1.
The ﬁrst is guaranteed explicitly by the obligation. The second is guaranteed by
R ⇒ this = t1#t2. As this refers from α1 to α1 by deﬁnition, this = t1#t2
guarantees t1#t2 also refers from α1 to α1. When t1 refers from α1 to α2 and
t1#t2 refers from α1 to α1, t2 must refer from α2 to α1.

this
α1 with IC
t1 
ﬀ
t2
α2 contains f coop I(t2)
Besides mutual visibility, cooperation requires the existence of dependent refer-
ences (t2 in the example above). That is, the invariant’s class must be reachable
from the supplier’s class. However, no expressive power is lost due to the additional
requirement, as auxiliary state (i.e., state only used for the purpose of speciﬁcation
and veriﬁcation) can be used when needed.
A formalization of the obligations needed to ensure that invariants hold when
they should is postponed until section 5.
4 Calls from Inconsistent States
By means of the novel speciﬁcation construct inc that is introduced in this section,
methods can make explicit that they will not rely on certain invariants of certain
objects. It is allowed to call these methods from inconsistent states where these
invariants do not necessarily hold. That is, inc allows the speciﬁer to pinpoint
visible states in which the visible state semantics is too strong and weakens it for
those speciﬁc states only.
Sometimes, initialization or update of an invariant is impossible without a
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class Left {
protected Right r coop I(this), J(r);
protected int val coop J(r);
protected int rVal coop I(this);
inv I def
this.rV al = this.r.val ∧ this.r.l = this;
Left() {
Right ri := new Right(this);
}
void setRight(Right ri) {
inc: I(this), J(ri)
pre: this = ri.l ∧ this.r = null ∧
this.val = X ∧ this.rV al = ri.val
post: I(this) ∧ this.r = ri ∧ this.val = X
this.r := ri;
}
void sync() {
inc: I(this)
pre: this.r.l = this
post: I(this)
int i := this.r.getVal(); this.rVal := i;
}
}
class Right {
protected Left l coop I(l), J(this);
protected int val coop I(l);
protected int lVal coop J(this);
inv J def
this.lV al = this.l.val ∧ this.l.r = this;
Right(Left le) {
inc: I(le)
pre: le.r = null ∧ le.val = 0 ∧ le.rVal = 0
post: I(le)
this.l := le; this.l.setRight(this);
}
void setVal(int newVal) {
post: this.val = newV al
this.val := newVal; this.l.sync();
}
int getVal() {
inc: I(this.l)
post: return = this.val
return := this.val;
}
}
Example 2. Left/Right (int ﬁelds initialize to 0, reference ﬁelds to null)
method call as it requires access to a set of ﬁelds that can not be accessed by
any single method. Consider example 2. Invariant I of class Left relates Left’s ﬁeld
rVal to class Right’s ﬁeld val. Right’s method setVal assigns to ﬁeld val. As shown
by the speciﬁcation of val, this might invalidate invariant I of the Left-object re-
ferred to by Right’s ﬁeld l. However, setVal can not assign to Left’s rVal to restore
the invariant. Instead, it has to call Left’s method sync from an inconsistent state.
The challenge is to allow such programs without having to weaken the invariant.
As a solution, we propose a weakening of the visible state semantics based on
the idea that the most intuitive invariants will almost always hold. Therefore, we
treat the cases where they do not as the exceptions that require additional eﬀort
and again rely on a form of cooperation. To this end, method speciﬁcations can be
extended by means of the speciﬁcation construct inc:
inc: inc-set
The inc-set is a set of reference invariants the method will not rely upon to hold
in its precondition. Left’s method sync, for instance, makes explicit it does not rely
on I(this). A method inherits the inc-set of a method it overrides and can extend
it if needed. Our semantics of invariants is captured by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 : A program has the invariant property iﬀ for every execution
sequence of the program the following holds:
• in the prestate of a method execution, the set of invalid instantiated invari-
ants is a subset of the set of instantiated invariants identiﬁed by the reference
invariants in that method’s inc-set.
• In the poststate of a method execution, the set of invalid instantiated invariants
is a subset of the set of invalid instantiated invariants in the prestate of that
method execution.
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Note that this semantics stays close to the visible state semantics. All invariants
hold in the pre- and post-state of a method with an empty inc-set. Only methods
that are involved in the initialization or update of certain invariants might need
a non-empty inc-set. For these methods, an important monotonicity-property is
maintained: every invariant that holds in the prestate of a method execution, holds
in the poststate of that method execution (even if it is in the method’s inc-set).
inc can be used when the invariant’s class is visible to the class whose method
is to be called. When this is not the case, we have to rely on the more traditional
technique of weakening the invariant using a ﬂag. A ﬂag is a boolean condition b
(for instance an auxiliary boolean ﬁeld of the class) that signals whether or not the
object is consistent. When the desired invariant predicate is R, deﬁne the invariant
as b ⇒ R instead. Then, when b is false, the invariant might be vulnerable to
the ﬂag, but is not vulnerable to any other location. However, a consequence of
this technique is that the relation between the invariant and object consistency
is reversed. Instead of the object being consistent when the invariant holds, the
invariant holds when the object is consistent.
While very ﬂexible, using a ﬂag means veriﬁcation or speciﬁcation eﬀort is re-
quired whenever the invariant is to be relied on. In particular, when specifying a
method it has to be decided whether or not it needs the invariant. In contrast,
inc requires deciding which methods are involved in initialization or update of cer-
tain invariants. This leaves more implementation freedom. That is, the inc-set is
typically empty, which means every invariant may be relied upon. inc also works
more naturally with subclassing. An overriding method in a subclass can rely on
invariants the superclass method does not rely on, for instance those added by the
subclass. Such an overriding method can also be used in the update or initialization
of additional invariants as extending the inc-set in the subclass method does not
aﬀect the superclass method or any of its users.
5 Proof Obligations
This section presents proof obligations suitable for the modular veriﬁcation of in-
variants. These proof obligations utilize the coop and inc constructs introduced in
the previous sections.
In the formulation of the proof obligations, it is assumed every method is fully
annotated, i.e. that every statement x has a precondition identiﬁed by Px and a
postcondition identiﬁed by Qx. The following theorem is established:
Theorem 5.1 When a program is correctly annotated and when the proof obliga-
tions presented in this section are met, the program has the invariant property.
This theorem has been proven for a sequential Java-like language. The proof
will appear in [12].
In section 3, we have deﬁned when a ﬁeld cooperates with a reference invariant.
Reference invariants are added to the proposition language to describe how ﬁelds
cooperate. A reference invariant holds when there is no referenced object, or when
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the referenced object’s instantiated invariant holds.
IC(r) =
def noObj(r) ∨ def(IC)[r/this]
P [r/this] is the predicate P with all occurrences of this replaced by r. noObj(r)
is deﬁned as:
noObj(s g1 . . . gi) =
def ∃j : 0 ≤ j ≤ i : s g1 . . . gj = null
Method calls whose return value is assigned to a ﬁeld with a non-empty coop-
set are disallowed (i.e., should be broken up into two statements). This avoids the
complication of invariants that are invalidated by a method return context switch.
The extension is straightforward.
Simply put, the dependency obligation ensures that when an assignment invali-
dates an invariant: 1. it is re-proven in a later state, and 2. until it is re-proven, no
method that relies on the invariant is called. This simple notion is complicated by
two issues: 1. one needs to keep track of the instantiated invariant that might be
invalid, and 2. state(ment) ordering is complicated by branching and looping. To
simplify the presentation, the latter complication is avoided by disallowing method
calls in branches and loops. Allowing such calls is a fairly straightforward extension.
Then, the body of a method M is a sequence body(M) of method calls and local
code blocks (lcbs) of statements that are not method calls. We write x < y when
x occurs before y in body(M). calls(M) and lcbs(M) yield the sequence of method
calls and lcbs in body(M), respectively. The pre- and postcondition of an lcb are
the precondition of the ﬁrst, and the postcondition of the last statement of the lcb,
respectively.
The dependency obligation is given below. It uses a logical variable X to ’freeze’
a reference to the object whose invariant might be invalidated by the assignment.
The invariant must be re-proven in a postcondition Qz after the assignment. No
method called between the assignment and the postcondition Qz may rely on the
invariant, which is guaranteed by inInc deﬁned below. To improve readability of the
obligations in this section, implies binds weakest, and all free variables on the left-
hand side of an implies are considered universally quantiﬁed over the implication.
dependency:
x ∈ lcbs(M) contains an assignment s to r.f and I(t) ∈ coop(f, statType(r))
implies ∃X ::
Ps ⇒ X = r#t and
∃z : z ∈ body(M) and x ≤ z :
(Qz ⇒ I(X) and ∀y : y ∈ calls(M) and x < y ≤ z : inInc(y, I,X))
inInc requires several other deﬁnitions. inc(M) yields the inc-set of method M .
e identiﬁes a side-eﬀect free expression. When statement y is a method call on
r.m(e1, . . . , ei), callee(y) yields the fully qualiﬁed methodname M determined by
m and statType(r). When callee(y) has formal parameters p1 to pi, actualization
act(r′, y) equals r′[r, e1, . . . , ei/this, p1, . . . , pi], i.e. act(r
′, y) refers to the same value
in the prestate of method call y as r′ refers to in the prestate of called method M .
inInc(y, I, r1) holds when there is a reference invariant in the inc-set of callee(y)
that identiﬁes the same instantiated invariant as identiﬁed by I(r1) in the prestate
of the call.
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inInc(y, I, r1) =
def ∃r2 : r2 ∈ {r | I(r) ∈ inc(callee(y))} : Py ⇒ r1 = act(r2, y)
We illustrate the use of the dependency obligation. Consider method setVal
in example 2. It consists of a lcb and a method call. The lcb contains (con-
sists of) an assignment to this.val. As I(this.l) ∈ coop(val, Right), the left-hand
side of the dependency obligation is met. That means the following is required
of the annotation of the method. There must be a logical variable X such that
X = this#this.l holds in the precondition of the assignment. Furthermore, I(X)
must hold in the postcondition of either the assignment or that of the method call.
Looking at the example, the ﬁrst will not be the case but the second will. In that
case, inInc(this.l.sync(), I,X) must hold as well. As the inc-set of Left’s method
sync contains I(this) and act(this, this.l.sync()) equals this.l, inInc requires that
X = this.l holds in the prestate of the call.
An invariant in a method M ’s inc-set may not be assumed to hold. The incon-
sistency obligation ensures that no method called by M relies on such an invariant
unless it has been re-proven before the call. PM identiﬁes the precondition of the
ﬁrst statement in body(M).
inconsistency: I(r) ∈ inc(M) implies ∃X ::
PM ⇒ X = r and
∀x : x ∈ calls(M) :
(inInc(x, I,X) or ∃y : y ∈ body(M) and y ≤ x : Py ⇒ I(X))
This only leaves the issue of initialization. In general, an invariant I deﬁned
by a class C will not hold in the prestate of a constructor of the class. In Java-
like languages, the ﬁrst (possibly implicit) statement in a constructor is a call to a
superclass constructor. In the Java semantics, the dynamic type of the this-object
in the prestate of this call is either C or a subclass of C. Due to dynamic method
binding, a method call in a superclass constructor might execute a method of C. Due
to the semantics of invariants, this method assumes all objects are consistent while
in fact this is not the case. There is no modular way to prevent this scenario without
restricting either invariants (to hold by default) or the programming language.
Such a restriction is avoided by assuming constructor behavior more akin to that
of C++. We assume that in the prestate of a constructor of class C, the dynamic
type of the this-object is Object. After the (possibly implicit) superclass constructor
call, there is an implicit statement that changes the dynamic type of the this-object
to type C. Note that, when D is the superclass of C, the type of the this-object is
D in the poststate of the superclass constructor call.
ﬁrstM identiﬁes the ﬁrst statement of method M . The construction obligation
ensures invariants are initialized by constructors and are not relied upon before
initialization:
construction: Method M is a constructor of class C and C deﬁnes an invariant
I implies ∃y : y ∈ body(M) and ﬁrstM < y :
Qy ⇒ I(this) and ∀x : x ∈ calls(M) and ﬁrstM < x ≤ y : inInc(x, I, this)
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6 Related work
As the previous sections have shown, one solution to the problem of vulnerability
(introduced in section 3) is to ensure that all invariants vulnerable to a location are
visible when this location is updated. The drawback is that this requires depen-
dencies to be mutually visible. Without this restriction, invariants that have been
invalidated by a method can not always be expected to be restored before the end of
that method. That means that in the prestate of a method execution, an unknown
set of invariants will not hold. Existing approaches without the mutual visibility
restriction use a notion of ownership to be able to express which invariants do hold.
Ownership means an object has control over updates of the objects it owns.
The ownership approach presented in [14] relies on an ownership type system
[13,3]. In such a type system, every object has a context of owned objects which
are reachable only through their owner. The approach allows invariants to depend
on ﬁelds that are (transitively) owned. The semantics of invariants is such that
invariants of objects outside the context can not be assumed to hold in pre- or
post-conditions of methods. Methods are in general not allowed to call methods on
objects outside their context to prevent that an invariant is assumed to hold when
it does not.
The Boogie approach [1,10] uses a dynamic notion of ownership. The main
advantage is that this allows ownership transfer. Boogie equips every invariant with
a ﬂag (see section 4). This ﬂag can only be updated by special-purpose statements
that guarantee the invariant holds when the object is made consistent. Furthermore,
objects make explicit that an invariant of a consistent object is vulnerable to their
state. Updates of such objects are forbidden. In the Boogie approach, the semantics
of invariants is such that in every state in which an object is consistent (i.e., in which
the ﬂag holds), its invariant holds.
Ownership is a concept that is natural to OO development. However, ownership
relations are non-cyclic by nature, and control over updates of the locations to which
an invariant is vulnerable is not always possible (or desired). Therefore, it is not
suitable for non-hierarchical situations like the Observer Pattern or the examples
in this paper.
The visibility approach in [14], which generalizes work in [10], has mutual visi-
bility as the only requirement. However, as argued in section 3, overall veriﬁcation
eﬀort is greatly reduced when it is made explicit which instantiated invariants might
be vulnerable to a location. Furthermore, it is argued that no expressive power is
lost in the process.
The most closely related work is that of the friendship approach [2]. The friend-
ship approach requires auxiliary state to relate locations to vulnerable invariants and
uses special-purpose statements to prevent unwanted updates. This paper shows
how this additional speciﬁcation layer can be avoided at the cost of some additional
veriﬁcation eﬀort. The main diﬀerence between the two approaches, however, is in
the semantics of invariants. The friendship approach has been developed to comple-
ment the Boogie approach, and uses the same semantics. This means that in cases
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where a ﬂag is unavoidable, their solution is elegant. However, the disadvantages
of a ﬂag-based solution as discussed in section 4 apply.
[17] introduces an extension of the friendship approach that supports static
invariants that quantify over objects and discusses uses for such invariants.
7 Future work
We see cooperation-based and ownership-based approaches as complementary. The
friendship approach [2] shows the beneﬁts of such a combination. Complementing
our cooperation-based approach with a notion of ownership is considered a priority.
More complex forms of cooperation can be achieved by supporting coop- and
inc-sets like {I(X) | P}, where P is a predicate on X (that is, when P [r/X] holds
in a given state, I(r) is in the set in that state). Perhaps quantiﬁcation over objects
in invariants can also be supported this way.
Some invariants should not be publicly accessible as they expose hidden infor-
mation. In such cases, the deﬁnition of the invariant could be made private to the
class that deﬁnes it. As an invariant’s name does not expose information, it can still
be used in coop-sets. An interesting side-eﬀect is that this can achieve that ﬁeld f
has public read-access, but private write-access. For instance, consider a publicly
accessible ﬁeld f whose coop-set contains I(this), where invariant I is deﬁned by
inv I private def true.
Finally, consider the Observer Pattern again. As the concrete observer is not
visible to the concrete subject (which is exactly the purpose of the abstract classes
in the pattern), our approach does not allow the observer’s invariant to depend
on the subject’s state. However, implementations of the pattern that do not use
abstract classes [2] are supported. Speciﬁcation of the full pattern requires a notion
of an abstraction of an invariant. Perhaps the abstract predicates of [15] or dynamic
contracts of [6] can provide such a notion.
8 Conclusions
Given a strong semantics of invariants, modular veriﬁcation is not possible when
invariants can arbitrarily depend on ﬁelds. The approach presented in this paper
allows dependencies that are mutually visible. In particular, this allows invariants
over non-hierarchical object structures. The approach allows for the separation
of two concerns that are often entwined, namely that of vulnerability and that of
method calls from inconsistent states. The dynamic vulnerability relations are made
explicit with the cooperation construct coop, which reduces veriﬁcation eﬀort. The
semantics of invariants is such that every object is consistent in every visible state
unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise by means of the novel construct inc. This se-
mantics is ﬂexible, yet captures the intuitive notion of invariants. Finally, the proof
obligations that we have presented enable the modular veriﬁcation of invariants.
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